Man in the middle attacks on IEC 60870-5-104

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Introduction

- Pete Maynard
- PhD Student
- CSIT Queen's University Belfast, UK
- Industrial Control System Security
- Partnership with PRECYSE



What I do

- Attacks on SCADA protocols
 - Replay, MITM, DoS
- Develop detection and prevention methods
- Anomaly detection via machine learning



PRECYSE

- European FP7 Project
- Prevention, protection and REaction to CYber attackS to critical infrastructurEs
- LINZ STROM GmbH (Electrical Distribution Operator)





Talk Overview


- What's SCADA Used for
- SCADA Threats
- Introduction IEC 104
- Attacking IEC 104



What's SCADA Used for?



How is SCADA used




• MODBUS, DNP3, IEC104, 61850, Profibus ...



[1] S. Mohagheghi, J. Stoupis, and Z. Wang. Communication protocols and networks for power systems-current status and future trends. In Power Systems Conference and Exposition, 2009. PSCE '09. IEEE/PES, pages 1–9, March 2009.

What does it do?

- Telemetry control
- Change Settings
- Read/Write/Delete files and directories
- Update firmware





SCADA Threats



Attack Levels

Level	Example
1 Accident	Misconfigured, Firmware Update
2 Novice	Script kiddie, port scanning
3 Experienced	Replay attack, basic knowledge
4 Advanced	Stuxnet, ICS domain knowledge



Threats

- Havex Malware
- OPC to scan for SCADA devices
- Reports back to command and control server
- Recently detected July 2014
 - European ICS
 - Team Since 2011
- State sponsored?



Scanning for SCADA devices

- Readily available
 scanners
 - SCADA StrangeLove
- Simple Python Script
- Return Device name, IP, software version





SCADA Fuzzers

- Protocol Fuzzers
- Project Robus
 - DNP3
 - Identified many vulnerabilities
- Fuzzing can kill





Protocol Analysers

	-						
	50876	0.000012	192.168.148.16		192.168.156.16	TCP	60 50876 > iec-104 [ACK] Seq=23 Ack=23 Win=1136 Len=0
	i 10	40.000010	100 100 140 10		102.168.156.16	104asdu	70 13,145->1 C_IC_NA_1 ActCon IOA=0
ASDU Type ID				Real-time	2.168.156.16	TCP	60 50876 > iec-104 [ACK] Seq=23 Ack=39 Win=1136 Len=0
Aobo Type Ib					2.168.156.16	104apci	60 <- S(2)
C_CI_NA_1 (101)					2.168.156.16	104asdu	79 13,145->1 M_SP_NA_1 Inrogen IOA=10010-10019 (10)
					2.168.156.16	TCP	60 50876 > iec-104 [ACK] Seq=29 Ack=64 Win=1136 Len=0
C_DC_NA_1 (46)					2.168.156.16	104asdu	70 13,145->1 M_DP_NA_1 Inrogen IOA=15000
C_RC_NA_1 (47)					2.168.156.16	TCP	60 50876 > iec-104 [ACK] Seq=29 Ack=80 Win=1136 Len=0
C_RD_NA_1 (102)					2.168.156.16	104apci	60 <- S(4)
M_DP_TB_1 (31)		C	_IC_NA_1 (100)		2.168.156.16	104asdu	70 13,145->1 C_IC_NA_1 ActTerm IOA=0
M_EI_NA_1 (70)					2.168.156.16	TCP	60 50876 > spearway [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=568 Len=6
M_ME_NB_1 (11)					2.168.156.16	104asdu	448 13,145->0 M_ME_NB_1 Spont IOA=39999 [Malformed Packet
M_DP_NA_1 (3)					2 168 156 16	TCP	60 50876 > iec-104 [ACK] Seq=35 Ack=114 Win=1136 Len=0
C_CS_NA_1 (103)					bytes captured (560 bits)	
M_IT_TB_1 (37)					:ab:01:10:f8), Ds	t: Motorola	_40:5d:8c (00:1c:11:40:5d:8c)
							:: 192.168.156.16 (192.168.156.16)
M_SP_NA_1 (1)					50876 (50876), Ds	t Port: iec-	104 (2404), Seq: 7, Ack: 7, Len: 16
					_		
	▼ IEC	60870-5-104	-Asdu: 13,145<-1 (C_IC_NA	_1 Deact_TEST IOA	=0 'interrog	gation command'
	TypeId: C_IC_NA_1 (100)						
	.000 0001 = NumIx: 1						
	$00 \ 1000 = CauseTx: Deact (8)$						
	.O = Negative: False						
	1.	= T	est: True				
	04	A: 1					
	Ac	ddr: 37133					
	10	0A: 0					

			40 00 40 06 13 2			\$@.@. *	
			09 64 67 5c a3 0			dg\Yg.	
		02 38 52 C5 0d 91 00 00	00 00 68 0e 00 0 00 14	00000	0 64 01 <u>88</u> 01 .8R 	hd.	
	0040	00 01 00 00	17				
	 Neg	jative (104asdı	u.nega), 1 byte	Packets	: 430 Displayed: 430 Mar	ked: 0 Load tir	ne: 0:00.004



Introduction IEC 104



Introduction IEC 60870-5-104

- International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
- IEC 60870 developed periodically between the years 1988 and 2000
- 6 Main Parts and four companion sections
- Open Standard
- 60870-5-104 defines transmission over TCP/IP




IEC 60870-5-104 Security Issues

- Ported from serial links to TCP/IP
- No authentication
- No encryption
- Uses IP address white-list
 - Defined on the slave
- TLS encryption recommended
 - In practice **not** implemented



104 Payload



ASDU



Attacking IEC 104



Capturing Packets

- SPAN Port
- DNS Poisoning
- Content Addressable Memory (CAM) table overflow
- ARP Spoofing




Replay Attack

- Novice level attack
- Capture and replay packets
 - Command, readings, alerts...
- Replayed packets dropped by kernel
- Tcpreplay alternatives to modify SEQ values

79 9.387334	192.168.148.16	192.168.156.16	iec-104 50876 TCP	60 iec-104 > 50876 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=765 L
80 9.387336	192.168.156.16	192.168.148.16	50876 iec-104 104apci	60 <err 6="" bytes=""></err>
81 9.387338	192.168.156.16	192.168.148.16	50876 iec-104 104apci	60 [TCP Retransmission] <err 6="" bytes=""></err>
82 9.387345	192.168.156.16	192.168.148.16	50876 iec-104 104apci	60 [TCP Retransmission] <err 6="" bytes=""></err>
83 9.387349	192.168.156.16	192.168.148.16	50876 iec-104 104apci	60 [TCP Retransmission] <err 6="" bytes=""></err>
84 9.387351	192.168.156.16	192.168.148.16	50876 iec-104 104apci	60 [TCP Retransmission] <err 6="" bytes=""></err>
85 9.387354	192.168.156.16	192.168.148.16	50876 iec-104 l04apci	60 [TCP Retransmission] <err 6="" bytes=""></err>
86 9.387357	192.168.156.16	192.168.148.16	50876 iec-104 l04apci	60 [TCP Retransmission] <err 6="" bytes=""></err>
87 9.387360	192.168.156.16	192.168.148.16	50876 iec-104 l04apci	60 [TCP Retransmission] <-U(STARTDT act)
88 9.387362	192.168.156.16	192.168.148.16	50876 iec-104 l04apci	60 [TCP Retransmission] <-U(STARTDT act)
89 9.387365	192.168.156.16	192.168.148.16	50876 iec-104 l04apci	60 [TCP Retransmission] <-U(STARTDT act)
90 9.387367	192.168.156.16	192.168.148.16	50876 iec-104 104apci	60 [TCP Retransmission] <-U(STARTDT act)
91 9.387371	192.168.156.16	192.168.148.16	50876 iec-104 104apci	60 [TCP Retransmission] <-U(STARTDT act)
92 9.387374	192.168.156.16	192.168.148.16	50876 iec-104 104apci	60 [TCP Retransmission] <-U(STARTDT act)
93 9.387378	192.168.156.16	192.168.148.16	50876 iec-104 l04apci	60 [TCP Retransmission] <-U(STARTDT act)
94 9.387380	192.168.148.16	192.168.156.16	iec-104 50876 TCP	60 iec-104 > 50876 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=6 Win=759 Len=0
95 9.387381	192.168.148.16	192.168.156.16	iec-104 50876 TCP	60 [TCP Dup ACK 94#1] iec-104 > 50876 [ACK] Seq=1 #21
96 9.387384	192.168.148.16	192.168.156.16	iec-104 50876 TCP	60 [TCP Dup ACK 94#2] iec-104 > 50876 [ACK] Seq=1 #
97 10.682047	10.50.50.105	10.50.50.255	blackja sentine UDP	82 Source port: blackjack Destination port: sentir
98 10 682075	10 50 50 105	10 50 50 255	hlackia.sentine UDP	82 Source port: blackiack Destination port: sentir

Man In the Middle Attack

- Intercept communications between two or more devices
- Modify and inject packets
- Many tools available
 - ettercap
 - cain and abel
 - DSniff





104 MITM Lab Experiment

- Modify Cause of transmission (CoT) field
- Intercept and set an invalid CoT value
- Detection with SNORT



Cause of Transmission

```
✓ IEC 60870-5-104-Apci: ->I(1,1)
```

ApduLen: 14

.... ..00 = ApciType: I (0x00)

- IEC 60870-5-104-Asdu: 13,145->1 C_IC_NA_1 ActCon IOA=0 'interrogation command' TypeId: C_IC_NA_1 (100)
 - .000 0001 = NumIx: 1

..00 Olll = CauseTx: ActCon (7)

.O.. = Negative: False O... = Test: False OA: 1 Addr: 37133 IOA: 0

0000	00 e0 ab 01	10 f8 00 lc	11 40 5d 8c 08 00 45 00	E.
0010	00 38 00 09	00 00 3b 06	ce 45 c0 a8 94 10 c0 a8	.8;E
0020	9c 10 09 64	c6 bc 05 59	67 c9 67 5c a3 17 50 10	dY g.g∖P.
0030	02 fd ce e8	00 00 68 0e	02 00 02 00 64 01 07 01	hd. <mark>.</mark> .
0040	Od 91 00 00	00 14		

- CoT values can use the following number ranges:
 - 1-13 and 20-41
 - 14-19 and 42-43 are reserved for future use.



Before and After Capture

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.50.50.105 (10.50.50.105), Dst: 10.50.50.75 (10.50.50.75) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: iec-104 (2404), Dst Port: 55561 (55561), Seg: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 23 ' IEC 60870-5-104-Apci: ->I(3,1) ApduLen: 2100 = ApciType: I (0x00) ' IEC 60870-5-104-Asdu: 0,0->0 M SP TB 1 Spont IOA=0 'single-point information with time tag CP56Time2a' TypeId: M SP TB 1 (30) .000 0001 = NumIx: 1 ..00 0011 = CauseTx: Spont (3) .O.. = Negative: False Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.50.50.105 (10.50.50.105), Dst: 10.50.50.75 (10.50.5 0... = Test: False Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: iec-104 (2404), Dst Port: 55561 (55561), Seq: 1 0A: 0 IEC 60870-5-104-Apci: ->I(3,1) Addr: 0 ApduLen: 21 TOA: 000 = ApciType: I (0x00) IEC 60870-5-104-Asdu: Value IEC 60870-5-104-Asdu: 0,0->0 M SP TB 1 <CauseTx=42> IOA=0 'single-point information wit TypeId: M SP TB 1 (30) $.000 \ 0001 = NumIx: 1$..10 1010 = CauseTx: Unknown (42) .O.. = Negative: False 0... = Test: False ff d7 76 ba 00 00 01 01 08 0a 00 00 6a 26 0e 2b 030 . . V 0A: 0 d8 2f 68 15 06 00 02 00 le 01 03 00 00 00 00 00 ./h Addr: 0 050 00 01 26 5a 1c 0e 09 09 0e ..δ IOA: 0 **Before** ▼ IEC 60870-5-104-Asdu: Value IOA: 0 Value: ON - Status: Not blocked, Not Substituted, Topical, Valid 14-09-09 (0) 14:28:23.078 (Valid) 2K.d....n.P. 020 32 4b 09 64 d9 09 f5 93 82 00 83 e3 6e 04 50 10 030 7f ff 59 33 00 00 68 15 06 00 02 00 le 01 2a 00 040 00 00 00 00 00 01 26 5a lc 0e 09 09 0e&Z



SNORT Alert

Rule

alert tcp \$104_CLIENT any -> \$104_SERVER \$104_PORTS (flow: established; content:"|68|"; offset:0; depth:1; pcre:"/[\S\s]{5}(\x2D|\x2E|\x2F|\x30|\x64|\x65)/iAR"; content:!"|06|"; offset: 8; depth: 1; msg:"17: SCADA_IDS: IEC 60870-5-104 – Suspicious Value of Transmission Cause Field"; classtype:bad-unknown; sid:6666617; rev:1; priority:2;)

Alert

[**] [1:6666617:1] 17: SCADA_IDS: IEC 60870-5-104 – Suspicious Value of Transmission Cause Field [**]

[Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2] 09/09-14:06:10.462288 10.50.50.105:40734 -> 10.50.50.75:22 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:60033 IpLen:20 DgmLen:60 DF *****S* Seq: 0x9A0C38A1 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x3908 TcpLen: 40 TCP Options (5) => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 1382076960 0 NOP WS: 7




Earth Fault




• Real world situation where an earth fault in the physical electrical grid occurs

Linz Test-bed





Operator View





104 MIM TestBed Environment

- Intercept value, so operators unable to view fault
- 104's Information Objects, M_SP_TB_1 stores the 'ON/OFF' value
- First bit of the SIQ is the SPI field, storing the ON/OFF value.

Information Object Address								
IV	NT	SB	BL				SPI	SIQ
CP24Time2a or CP56Time2a								Three or seven-octet binary time

ON/OFF Value Modification

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.50.50.105 (10.50.5)	0.105), Dst: 10.50.50.75 (10.50.50.75)
▶ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: iec-104 (2404)	, Dst Port: 55561 (55561), Seq: 168, Ack: 25, Len: 23
▼ IEC 60870-5-104-Apci: ->I(11,1)	
ApduLen: 21	
00 = ApciType: I (0x00)	
▼ IEC 60870-5-104-Asdu: 0,0->0 M_SP_TB_1 Spont IOA=0 'sind	gle-point information with time tag CP56Time2a'
TypeId: M_SP_TB_1 (30)	
.000 0001 = NumIx: 1	
00 0011 = CauseTx: Spont (3)	
.0 = Negative: False	Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.50.50.105 (10.50.50.105), Dst: 10.50.50.75 (10.50.5
0 = Test: False	Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: iec-104 (2404), Dst Port: 55561 (55561), Seq: 1
0A: 0	▼ IEC 60870-5-104-Apci: ->I(11,1)
Addr: O	ApduLen: 21
IOA: 0	
▼ IEC 60870-5-104-Asdu: Value	▼ IEC 60870-5-104-Asdu: 0,0->0 M SP TB 1 Spont IOA=0 'single-point information with time t
IOA: 0	TypeId: M_SP_TB_1 (30)
Value: ON - Status: Not blocked, Not Substituted, Te	• .000 0001 = NumIx: 1
14-09-09 (0) 14:31:40.948 (Valid)	00 00ll = CauseTx: Spont (3)
	.O = Negative: False
, 0030 ff b3 43 ab 00 00 01 01 08 0a 00 00 71 e0 0e 2d .	0 = Test: False
0040 21 79 68 15 16 00 02 00 1e 01 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 9	OA: O
0050 00 01 f4 9f 1f 0e 09 09 0e	Addr: O
	IOA: O
Before	▼ IEC 60870-5-104-Asdu: Value
	IOA: O
	Value: OFF - Status: Not blocked, Not Substituted, Topical, Valid
	14-09-09 (0) 14:31:40.948 (Valid)
	0020 32 4b 09 64 d9 09 f5 93 82 c4 83 e3 6e 28 50 10 2K.dn(P. 0030 7f ff 9e 06 00 00 68 15 16 00 02 00 1e 01 03 00 h
	0040 00 00 00 00 00 00 f4 9f 1f 0e 09 09 0e
	After
CENTRE	



Conclusion

- Attackers with varying skill levels can compromise SCADA systems
 - Man-In-The-Middle attacks hiding an earth fault
- New implementations of ICS need to take precautions
- Monitor logs, network, everything
- Enable attack mitigations



Future Work

- Identify features of the IEC104 protocol for anomaly detection
- Propose to develop an Anomaly Detection module for the IEC104 protocol
 - Detect similar network attacks
- Work on MITM attack for IEC 61850



Questions

